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ABSTRACT
In Vietnam, the number of fishing vessels, especially near the shore, has increased
continuously, despite the Government’s aim for reduction. In particular, 80% of the fishing
vessels operate in the coastal areas that make up only 11% of the exclusive economic zone.
Such heavy use of near-shore fish resources could imply overfishing and economic decline.
Therefore, the economic performance of the inshore purse seine vessels in an open -access
fishery have been investigated , based on a 2011 survey of cost and earnings data of a sample of
62 anchovy purse seiners, representing about 46 % of such v essels in Nha Trang, Vietnam. The
empirical results show that an average purse seiner was able to cover all the costs and earned  a
profit margin of 17.41% and crew members earned their opportunity cost of labour or above.
Engine power, number of crew size,  number of fishing days and dummy variable for location
are identified as the main factors affecting the annual vessel performance, represented by gross
revenue. An application of the Salter diagram shows that a large number of vessels with high
relative standardised effort are the most cost -efficient vessels. The majority of these vessels
earned intra-marginal rent despite the open-access characteristics of this fishery.
Keywords: Economic performance; Intra-marginal rent; Standardised effort; Cost and earnings;





In Vietnam, the fisheries sector is a significant contributor to the economy. Approximately 3.4
million people, or approximately 10% of the labour force, are employed in this sector (Long et
al., 2008). In addition, the fisheries sector has contributed to both the domestic income
development and the international trade relation development for the country. One-tenth of the
export earnings for Vietnam stems from fisheries products, and was worth US$2.2 billion USD
in 2003 (FAO, 2005a). Specifically, the density of the GDP of the fisheries sector increased
from nearly 3% in 1990 to 3.4% in 2000 and reached about 4% in 2006 (MPI, 2010; Pomeroy
et al., 2009). However, the economic opportunities and the open access to the marine
resources are attracting increasing numbers of people to become involved in fisheries annually.
The catches per unit of effort have, however, decreased. The earnings from fishing activities
have fallen and have sometimes been insufficient to cover the fishing cost (FAO, 2005a).
Therefore, an assessment of the annual performance is needed for the monitoring and
improvement of Vietnam’s fisheries policy (Kim Anh et al., 2006).
Vietnam has a coastline of 3,260 km, which crosses 13 latitudes, from 8°23'N to 21°39'N,
more than 1 million km2 of EEZ (exclusive economic zone), 12 lagoons and 112 estuaries.
There are four main fishing areas: the Gulf of Tonkin, shared with China; Central Vietnam;
South-Eastern Vietnam; and South-Western Vietnam (part of the Gulf of Thailand), shared
with Cambodia and Thailand. The marine catches are highest in Central and South-Eastern
Vietnam. The Mekong River delta provides over 75% of the total marine landings and
therefore most of the fishing industry is concentrated in the southern provinces, from Khanh
Hoa to Ca Mau (FAO, 2009).
Apart from these geographical zones, the fishing areas can be divided into inshore–coastal
fishery and offshore fishery. Inshore waters are considered to be waters less than 30 m deep in
the Tonkin Gulf and the south and less than 50 m deep in the centre of Vietnam (FAO, 2009).
In recent years, the number of fishing vessels, especially near the shore, has increased
continuously despite the Government’s aim for reduction. In particular, 80% of the fishing
vessels operate in the coastal areas that make up only 11% of the exclusive economic zone.
Such heavy use of near-shore fish resources could imply overfishing and economic decline
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(Luong, 2009). Therefore, a study on the economic performance of the fisheries is an essential
requirement for fisheries management.
Khanh Hoa is located in South Central Vietnam, with a coastline of 520 kilometres and more
than 200 islands (Long et al., 2008). Nha Trang is the central city of Khanh Hoa province. This
city is not only an attractive destination for tourism, but also a potential area for further
development of fisheries (Thanh Thuy et al., 2008). In recent years, fisheries in Nha Trang
have grown extensively, which has contributed to the overall development of the city’s
economy and improved the life of fishermen; especially, the purse seine fleet is the main kind
of inshore fishery. However, the fisheries in Nha Trang are still open access, and as such are
currently facing many problems, such as the overexploitation of marine resources and excess
harvesting capacity (Hien, 2011). Hence, this study aims to investigate the economic
performance of vessels in an open-access fishery. It is well known in the fisheries economics
literature that the potential resource rent is wasted under open-access equilibrium if the fleet
consists of homogenous vessels. However, a homogenous fleet hardly exists in actual fisheries;
in the case of heterogeneous vessels, an intra-marginal rent may be generated even under an
open-access regime. Therefore, this study not only paints an up-to-date picture of the current
economic performance of the fisheries but also provides evidence to support the reason why
the purse seine fisheries are still able to generate profits for society even under open-access
equilibrium. This may be useful for fisheries managers in managing and developing the purse
seine fisheries in Vietnam.
1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM
Vietnamese fisheries are mostly small scale in nature. Fishing is thus concentrated in coastal
waters and this has resulted in heavy pressure on near-shore resources. Referring to Research
Institute Marine Fisheries (RIMF) information that the exploitable potential of marine waters
up to the 50 m depth range is an estimated 582,000 tonnes/year, it has been emphasized that
from 1991 onwards the catch has exceeded its sustainable limits, and that the overall
profitability of the fishing fleet had decreased (FAO, 2005a). This indicates that the inshore
fisheries face serious constraints to further development, at least from a biological perspective.
Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development proposed two major
development goals for Vietnam’s coastal fisheries up to the year 2015: first, to make
appropriate adjustments to coastal fishing and restore and preserve the coastal marine
resources and their eco-system; and second, to improve the livelihoods of the fishers dependent
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on coastal marine resources in order to contribute to food security and poverty alleviation
among them (FAO, 2005a).
To reach these goals, Vietnamese policy makers require not only reliable assessments of
inshore resources, but also an understanding of the economic realities of each inshore fishing
fleet (Long et al., 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to carry out a study on the economic
performance of the inshore vessels in an open-access fishery; some questions that may arise
are “What are the economic performance indicators of inshore fishing vessels”, “Is the fishing
fleet profitable?”, “What is the income of crew members and how does this compare with that
of other people in the city?”, “Which vessels are more or less economically efficiency than
others?” and “What are the main determinants of annual vessel production?”. Fisheries
managers, at the industry level, may use the information to design and implement policy
instruments to achieve the above two major development goals. Fishermen, at the vessel level,
may also use this information to improve their fishing benefits.
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis will address three main objectives. The first is to present the cost and earnings
findings in 2011 based on data collected through a representative survey of 62 anchovy vessels,
accounting for about 46% of the anchovy purse seine vessels in Nha Trang, and then a set of
economic performance indicators are analysed, including gross revenue, income, gross cash
flow, profit, profit margin and return on investment. The second objective is to investigate the
impact of some important technical and operational characteristics of the vessel regarding its
performance represented by annual gross revenue. This is performed by regression analysis of
the vessel’s gross revenue by means of some technical and operational characteristics of the
vessel, such as horsepower, crew size, the number of fishing days and a dummy variable for
location. Gross revenue is used as a proxy for production since we lack catch volume data. The
third objective is to investigate why profits are still generated even under an open-access
regime. In the case of heterogeneous vessels, we have seen that the most cost-efficient vessels
make above-normal profits, called intra-marginal rent. Therefore, these vessels may create net
benefits for society. For this reason, I want to find out which vessel group is the most cost-
efficient. This can be achieved by calculating the average cost per relative standardised effort
and and the average revenue per relative standardised effort for each vessel. In addition to the
main objectives, we also demonstrate that even a relatively small survey may provide
statistically reliable information. This is of particular importance in a developing country,
where fishing industry data are scarce and costly to collect (Raakjaer et al., 2007).
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND OF VIETNAM’S FISHERIES INDUSTRY
AND KHANH HOA’S FISHERIES INDUSTRY
2.1. VIETNAM’S FISHERIES INDUSTRY
Vietnam has a coastline of about 3,260 km and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends
over more than 1 million square kilometres. Its coast has many bays and estuaries as well as
diverse coastal and marine resources, with more than 2,100 species of fish, over 75 species of
shrimp, about 653 species of marine alga and other species of high economic value (Nga, 2009;
Thao, 2002). Its sea areas are divided into a number of regions, as shown in Table 2.1. The fish
stock estimates total almost 4.2 million tonnes and the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 1.67
million tonnes (MOFI, 2005; RIMF, 2001). These favourable natural conditions have created
many opportunities for Vietnam to develop its marine capture as well as aquatic farming
activities.







Tonkin Gulf 681,200 272,500 16.3
Central 606,400 242,600 14.5
South-East 2,075,900 830,400 49.7
South-West 506,700 202,300 12.1
The small and big
pelagic species
310,000 122,500 7.4
Total 4,180,200 1,670,300 100
Source: MOFI, 2005; RIMF, 2001
Consequently, the fisheries sector plays an important role in the national economy, accounting
for about 4% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006 and generating 9–10% of the total
Vietnamese export revenues. This sector also provides jobs for approximately 4 million people
(Pomeroy et al., 2009). The total export value from the fisheries sector was US$3 billion in
2006 and $3.49 billion in 2009; it reached a peak of $5 billion in 2010. The total export
volume for 2006 was 811.5 thousand metric tons, a 29.4% increase over 2005. Catfish and
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shrimp constitute by far the largest share of aquatic exports, accounting for over 22% and 44%,
respectively, of the total export earnings in 2006. Vietnamese fishery products have now
reached more than 120 countries and territories on 5 continents. The markets of the United
States and Japan are the two largest export destinations, by country, while European Union
nations, as a group, received the largest share of exports by volume (364 thousand tonnes) and
by value ($1.2 billion, making up 23.5%) in 2010 (Duc, 2011). These figures combined help
Vietnam achieve a leading position, joining the group of the ten largest seafood exporters in
the world.
However, Vietnam’s marine fisheries are referred to as small-scale, multi-species, multi-gear
and open-access fisheries (FAO, 2009). The marine fisheries production has increased
continuously over time and the number of fishing vessels has increased significantly and far
exceeded the control (FAO, 2005a). By the end of 2001, the number of powered vessels was
approximately 79,000, with a total capacity of 3,722,557 hp, an increase of 172.41%
and 714.92% in terms of vessel numbers and horsepower, respectively, when compared with
1985 (FAO, 2005a). This figure continued to increase to 85,914 vessels with a total
capacity of more than 4,721,701 hp in 2005 (Luong at al., 2009). According to a report by the
FAO, the total engine power of the marine fishing fleet increased by about 12% per annum in
the earliest years of this century. About 84% of the marine fishing vessels have an engine size
of less than 90 HP. The fishing grounds of these vessels have focused mainly on coastal sea
areas3 (FAO, 2005a; Pomeroy et al., 2009), which has resulted in heavy pressure on inshore
resources (FAO, 2005a).
The coastal fishing pressure has increasingly threatened and possibly depleted the coastal
aquatic resources. Long (2002) investigated the trend in fishing capacity and fishery
outputs during the last two decades. The fast increase in the number of vessels and engines
has led to a decrease in the catch per unit of effort, from 1.11 tonnes/hp in 1985 to 0.61
tonnes/hp in 1993 and 0.36 tonnes/hp in 2004 (FAO 2005a; Long, 2002; Pomeroy et al., 2009).
This is a consequence of the overexploitation of the coastal resources in Vietnam, resulting in
an unbalance between the potential coastal stock abundance and the fishing capacity in terms
of the amount of fishing vessels (FAOa, 2005).
In order to reduce the pressure on coastal fisheries resources, the Vietnamese Government has
formulated a policy to develop the offshore fishery and a programme of investment in
offshore vessels has thus been implemented since 1997 (FAO, 2004 and 2005a). However, the
majority of coastal fishermen’s communities are poor and lack the capital as well as the
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knowledge necessary for offshore fishing activities; therefore, few fishers have been able to
afford investments in offshore vessels. As a result, the offshore fishing programme has not
perfectly obtained its goals (FAO, 2005a). In order to maintain and develop the fisheries in a
sustainable way, it is necessary to have appropriate management policies to reduce the fishing
pressure on coastal waters, promote offshore fisheries and regulate coastal fishing activities in
correspondence with the current stock status.
2.2. Khanh Hoa Fisheries Industry
Khanh Hoa is located along the coastal zone in Central Southern Vietnam. It is bordered by
Phu Yen in the North, Ninh Thuan in the South, Dac Lac and Lam Dong in the West and the
South China Sea in the East. On the map, Khanh Hoa extends from 108°40’33’’ to
109°27’55’’ across eastern longitudes, and from 11°42’50’’ to 12°52’15’’ across northern
latitudes. Its land area is approximately 5,260 km2 and the coastline stretches for 520
kilometres. This coastline is made up of territorial waters and more than 200 islands (Kim Anh
et al., 2006; Kim Anh et al., 2007; Long et al., 2008). Khanh Hoa’s marine resources are
considered to be abundant and diversified. According to a report by the IEFP and RIMF
(2005), the Khanh Hoa sea area is inhabited by about 600 fish species, of which there are 50
species with a high economic value. The pelagic fish species make up a large proportion, with
an estimated amount of 115,800 tonnes. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is estimated
to be about 38,000 tonnes per year (IEFP and RIMF, 2005). Thanks to these natural
advantages, Khanh Hoa has had a long tradition of development for marine capture fisheries
(Kim Anh et al., 2006; Kim Anh et al., 2007).
Therefore, the fisheries sector has become an important economic sector for Khanh Hoa
province and has played an important role in restructuring agriculture and reducing poverty.
An example of this achievement in Khanh Hoa is the increase in the export value from 120
million USD to 265 million USD. Aquaculture alone increased by 16% per year during the
2001 to 2007 period, contributing substantially to the local GDP and creating about 48,000
jobs (Hong Nga, 2010). From now until 2015 and with a view to 2020, Khanh Hoa province
will be striving to reach a fishing output of 120,000 tonnes, including natural catching of
90,000 tonnes and aquaculture of 30,000 tonnes. The export revenue will exceed US$500
million a year (VCCI, 2010).
Due to the favourable conditions, Khanh Hoa fisheries have made considerable achievements
and are continuing to do so. However, the fisheries in Khanh Hoa are still open-access and
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multi-species fisheries in nature. The number of fishing vessels has increased significantly
over time. In 2008, Khanh Hoa had 10,188 fishing vessels with a total capacity of
354,121 horsepower, equivalent to 35 hp/vessel, an increase of about 16.7% compared with
2000 (Nga, 2010). With the increase in the number of vessels, the total engine capacity of the
fleet has increased remarkably – an average annual increase of 18%. By the end of 2009, the
number of vessels in Khanh Hoa province was about 12,802 boats, an increase of about 26%
in comparison with 2008 (DECAFIREP, 2009).
Table 2.2: The distribution of vessels by fishing gear and engine power in Khanh Hoa, 2009
Range of engine power
Gear type 0-<20 20-<50 50-<90 90-<250 250-<400 400-<4000 Total Rate
Gill net 394 144 82 105 88 15 828 6.50%
Longline 860 277 55 86 19 2 1299 10.10%
Trawl 400 791 291 187 16 3 1688 13.20%
Purse seine 642 260 74 17 1 1 995 7.80%
Purse seine
using light
1871 1194 169 83 5 0 3322 25.90%
Lift net 239 52 59 56 6 3 415 3.20%
Others 3619 581 37 16 1 1 4255 33.20%
Total 8025 3299 767 550 136 25 12802 100%
Rate 62.70% 25.80% 6.00% 4.30% 1.10% 0.20% 100%
Source: Department of Capture Fisheries and Resources Protection of Khanh Hoa
(DECAFIREP) (2009).
In order to increase the catch, the fishermen use a variety of fishing gears, including the gill
net, long line, trawl, seine net, set net and hook. Among them, the number of purse seiners
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using lights was the biggest, with 3322 vessels or approximately 25% of the total fishing boats
in Khanh Hoa, followed by the number of trawlers, accounting for 13.2% in total; the lift net
(3.2%) appears at the end of the list. Besides, Table 2.2 shows that the vessels with an engine
capacity of less than 20 hp are the most popular, with 8025 vessels (62.7%); approximately
89% of the total mechanized vessels have less than 50 HP, and 95% have less than 90 HP. In
general, the fisheries in Khanh Hoa are mostly small scale in nature, which is the same
situation as for Vietnamese fisheries. Thus, fishing activities are concentrated in coastal areas
and this has resulted in heavy pressure on near-shore resources.
Coastal resources are becoming exhausted, while the size of vessels, the capacity of engines
and the fishing pressure are still increasing. This has led to the catch per vessel (in
tonnes/vessel) and the catch per unit of engine power (in tonnes/hp) having almost declined
during the period of time 2001–2009. The average annual decrease rate was 9.4% of catch per
vessel and 12% of catch per hp during this period. In 2009, the catch per vessel and catch per
hp decreased to 5.65 tonnes and 0.195 tonnes, respectively (Duy, 2010).
In summary, coastal waters are very important to fisheries in Vietnam in general and Khanh
Hoa specifically. They produce 82% of the total marine catch and comprise the fishing
grounds of small fishing vessels that constitute 84% of the total mechanized fishing vessels.
Coastal waters also serve as the source of living for poor fishers, whose population constitutes
88% of the total capture fisheries labour force. However, the coastal resources have been
overexploited, and there is an imbalance between the fishing capacity (in terms of the quantity
of fishing vessels) and the potential coastal stock abundance (FAO, 2005a). In order to
maintain and develop the fisheries in a sustainable way, it is necessary to adopt appropriate
management policies to reduce the fishing pressure on coastal waters. Therefore, assessing the
economic performance of inshore fisheries in Khanh Hoa province is necessary to provide
information and insights for the policy-making process in fisheries development.
2.3. Khanh Hoa Purse Seine Fisheries Industry
Purse seine fishing plays an important role in the fisheries in Khanh Hoa province. It uses one
of the selective kinds of fishing gears that has high productivity and is also very popular in
fishing countries all over the world. In Vietnam, there are two main fishing methods for purse
seine fishing: fishing with light and fish aggregation devices, and the searching method. The
method of using light and fish aggregation devices is very popular in many fishery provinces.
For this method, the average size of the net is about 250–500 metres in length and 45–70
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metres in depth (Luong, 2009). At present, in Khanh Hoa this practice is supplemented with
additional features, including the use of lighting and echo sounders to attract and search for
fish. The lighting method gathers schools of fish under light sources and the net is set to
encircle them (Thanh Thuy el al, 2008). The searching method usually specializes in catching
high-speed pelagic fishes. The skipper uses an echo sounder as well as his own eyes to
observe the sea while the vessel moves at a moderate speed. When fish schools are found, the
skipper has to assess the direction of their movement, as well as their abundance, in order to
approach and encircle them (Thanh Thuy el al, 2008). For this method, the nets are larger: the
average net size is 500–1200 metres in length and 70–120 metres in depth. This fleet is also
characterized by modern fishing equipment, mechanical implements and fish finders (Luong,
2009).
In recent years, the number of purse seine vessels and the total fleet engine power have
developed quickly in Khanh Hoa. In 2010, the total number of purse seine vessels with an
engine capacity of more than 20 hp was 1389 units (DECAFIREP, 2010), of which about
77.2% were boats with an engine of less than 50 hp and almost 91% boats with an engine of
less than 90 hp (see Table 2.3). Most of these groups are allocated to the Van Ninh district and
Nha Trang and Cam Ranh city.
Nha Trang city had 415 units in total of 1389 purse seine vessels. Among them, the number of
purse seine vessels with an engine of less than 50 hp was 257 vessels (accounting for nearly
62%) and 327 vessels with an engine of less than 90 hp (making up about 79%). Most purse
seine vessels with an engine of more than 90 hp were concentrated in this city. In Nha Trang,
the purse seiners are mostly anchovy vessels. For anchovy purse seiners, the target species are
seasonal pelagic fish, mainly anchovy (Stolephorus spp.) but also other species like mackerel
(Scomberomorus spp.), skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) and scad (Decaterus spp.). Of
these, the anchovy yields the highest revenue. The average annual operating time for an
anchovy purse seiner is about 9 months. The high season for the anchovy purse seine fishery
stretches from March to August or September. The remaining months are called the low
season (Thanh Thuy et al, 2008).
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Table 2.3: The distribution of purse seine vessels by location and engine size in Khanh Hoa, 2010
Districts in Khanh Hoa
Range of engine
power
Nha Trang Cam Ranh Ninh Hoa Van Ninh Cam Lam
Total Rate
20-<50 257 223 124 428 40 1072 77.2
50-<90 70 45 33 39 6 193 13.9
90-<250 78 11 10 15 0 114 8.2
250-<400 8 0 0 0 0 8 0.6
400-<500 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.1
Total 415 279 167 482 46 1389 100%
Rate
29.9 20.1 12.0 34.7 3.3 100%
Source: DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2010).
The fishing ground for Nha Trang purse seine vessels is in and around Nha Trang Bay and the
fishing  ground for Cam Ranh purse seiners is in and around Cam Ranh Bay. Anchovy purse
seiners cannot operate in fishing grounds far away because of strong water currents and the
propulsive forces of the net, which has a small mesh size (2 mm) (Thanh Thuy el al, 2008).
The length of each fishing trip is 1 day and purse seiners only catch inshore.
For pelagic fish purse seiners, the main species targeted are also seasonal fish such as scad
(Decaterus spp.), mackerel (Scomberomorus spp.) and skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis).
Anchovy are rarely caught. The average annual operating time is 6.8 months, stretches from
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February to July or August. In March and April, these vessels move to the fishing ground in
Ninh Thuan province, South of Khanh Hoa, to catch mackerel. The fishing grounds stretch
from Khanh Hoa to the Ninh Thuan Sea. Therefore, the length of each fishing trip is often
longer, varying from 1 to 3 days. The mesh sizes are comparatively bigger than those of
anchovy purse seiners, varying from 8 to 12 mm. Well-equipped pelagic fish purse seiners can
catch either inshore or offshore (Thanh Thuy el al, 2008).
In short, the purse seine fishery in Khanh Hoa remains open access and largely small scale. In
recent years, Vietnam’s Government has adopted national offshore fisheries development to
reduce the fishing efforts in coastal waters. However, most coastal fishing communities are
poor and lack capital. In addition, their education level is low; therefore, their ability to acquire
and operate modern equipment and machines is very limited. As a result, the offshore fishing
programme has not perfectly obtained its goals and the fishing activities are still
concentrated in coastal areas. This has led to conditions of excessive exploitation. Hence, the
top priorities for fisheries are the establishment of an effective system for aquatic resource




Fisheries management has many objectives, such as increase yields, maximize  resource rent,
rebuild overfished stocks, or maintain biodiversity. Governments  increasingly demand  that
fisheries managers associate each objective to measurable performance indicators supported
by scientific data in order to evaluate the  success of management  strategies and objectives
(Cochrane, 2002). Besides, the assessment of economic performance is a key element in
furthering understanding of the economic incentives that exist in the fishery (Pascoe,
Robinson and Coglan, 1996). Hence,  economic surveys of fisheries have been carried out in
many nations for many years as a means of assessing the economic performance of their
fisheries (Duy, 2010). In the European Union, concerted action on the economic assessment of
EU fisheries has produced indicators on economic performance of selected European fishing
fleets since 1998. The summary document on the "Economic Performance of Selected EU
fishing fleets" had been prepared by the European Commission. The economic performance
indicators were based on revenue, cost, profit, employment and landings composition. This
document showed economic results of 16 national fleets for 2005. It consisted useful
economic information on value added indicators. It also provided comprehensive annual
economic information on the economic situation of all EU fishing fleets for fisheries managers
and stakeholders, as well as for people not directly involed in the fisheries sector (European
Commission, 2007).
In Norway, Flaaten et al. (1995) studied the profitability for the Norwegian purse seine fishery,
with costs and earning data of 1983 and 1984. This is performed by comparing the
profitability of purse seine vessels which received their licenses for free, with the profitability
of vessels which had to purchase the license. The study concluded that, vessels that received
free licenses had a significantly higher profitabilty than the other vessels. This was due to the
owners who bought licenses had the highest capital costs (Flaaten et al., 1995).
Another research of Floc’h et al. (2008) investigated the capital value and the economic
performance of  the commercial  fishing  fleet  of  the  French  region  of  Brittany. Based on
two data sources (bookkeeping or field surveys), measures of economic performance could be
produced for the short term using gross surplus; and for the long term including the cost of
capital and then the differences between them were then discussed (Floc’h et al., 2008).
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In the United Kingdom (UK), the costs and earnings surveys were carried out in the English
Channel fishery in 1994-1995. The results were used to assess the financial and economic
performance of boats in the fisheries. It was estimated that most operators covered their cash
costs during the 1994-1995 financial year. However, the level of cash profits varied greatly
between boats depending on size class and main fishing activity. On average, the economic
profit in the fishery was negligible. This indicated that the English Channel fishery had not
managed to its full potential in 1994-1995 (Pascoe, Robinson and Coglan, 1996).
Whitmarsh et al. (2000) studied the profitability of marine commercial fisheries in the UK. In
this study, the authors suggested that the need of separating the measures of economic and
financial performance. The financial performance indicators were based on the concept of
income and the explicit costs. Meanwhile, economic performance indicators were based on the
concept of efficiency. They were assessed by relating the value of output to the real cost of the
inputs needed to produce it. The study also showed that the role of costs and earnings surveys
in assessing not only the current state of fisheries but also the indicators of the profit-earning
potential under alternative fisheries management systems. Hence, the bioeconomic modelling
was also required  (Whitmarsh et al.,2000).
In Australia, Roger Rose et al. (2000) researched the economic performance of three
commonwealth fisheries the northern prawn fishery; the offshore trawl sector of the south east
fishery; and the east coast tuna and billfish fishery. The framework was based on a measure of
the net returns to the fisheries.  The results  of  this  study showed  that  the importance of
integrating economic and biological indicators in assessing the performance of fisheries
management. By examining the full range of indicators and their interactions, this could lead to
improve the management of fisheries (Rose et al., 2000).
In the United States (U.S.), Agar et al. (2005) investigated the costs and earnings study of fish
trap fishery in U.S. Caribbean in 2003. The main socio-economic characteristics of the trap
fishery were described in the contexts of  the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Territory of
the U.S. Virgin Islands. The study indicated that higher gross revenues were always not likely
to translate into higher net revenues. It also showed that the various economic surpluses
generated because of the heterogeneity of the trap fishery in U.S. Caribbean and the presence
of negative economic earnings were imputed as evidence of the overinvestment of the trap
fisheries (Agar et al., 2005).
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Adeogun O. A et.al. (2011) evaluated  the  economic  performance  of  small-scale  crab
fishery  in Nigeria during the 2009-2010 fishing season in five lagoon systems in Lagos state.
The objectives of the study were to identify economic viability of the crab fishing activity and
to find out factors affecting  the cost structure. The results showed  that  small-scale crab
fishing had a positive net profit  and  fully  recover  their costs. The net  cash  flow,  economic
and  financial  performance  of  the  crab  fishers considered to be a good result. The study also
concluded that improving efficiency of crab fishing is a key element to reducing cost.
In 1987, a study on the profitability for the Thai trawl fishery was performed in the Gulf of
Thailand by Panayotou and Jentanavanich through four surveys in 1969, 1974, 1977 and 1982.
In this study, some economic indicators were presented, such as revenues, costs, gross profits,
net profits, pure profits, and rate of return on capital as well as catch per unit effort. The study
concluded that an effective  strategy  for the solution of Thailand's  fisheries  would  involve
the construction  of new  trawlers,  the  licensing  and  control  of the  activities  of existing
vessels  (Panayotou and Jentanavanich, 1987).
On a global scale, FAO Fisheries Department began collecting empirical information on the
economic of fishing operations in 1995 in close cooperation with fisheries research institutions
and national fisheries administrations in selected nations in Asia, Africa, Latin America and
Europe. According to reports in FAO Fisheries Technical Papers 377, 421 and 482, studies of
costs and earnings carried out by FAO  in 1995-1997, 1999-2000, and 2002-2003 (FAO 1999;
FAO 2001, FAO 2005b).
In 2005, FAO presented the findings of country level studies on the economic and financial
performance of marine capture fisheries. The studies were carried out in 13 South American,
Caribbean, European, African and Asian countries during 2002 and 2003 with the 94 most
important fishing fleets in these countries operating covered. The results showed that all 94
types of fishing vessels had a positive gross cash flow and fully recovered their operating costs,
88 of the 94 types of vessels (accounted for 94%) showed a net profit after deducting operating
costs and capital costs. The studies also presented that there were significant improvements in
financial and economic performance of fishing fleets in the Republic of Korea, Germany and
Argentina in comparison with in both 1999-2000 and in 2002-2003, partially due to reduction
and limitation of fleet capacity. In the other nations, the overall picture remained similar, with
some fleets improving their performance and others achieving less favourable results.
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Beside that, many authors presented the economic performance through the measurement of
technical efficiency and economic efficiency of fishing fleets. This is performed by using
Stochastic Production Frontiers (SPF) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The
performance of firms relative to this frontiers can then be assessed and aggregated to determine
the overall efficiency of an entire sector or  fishing  fleet  (Coelli et al. 2005). Data
envelopment analysis (DEA)  involves the use of mathematical linear programming techniques
to construct a non-parametric  surface  (or  frontier)  over  the  data,  so  that  efficiencies  of
sampled  firms  can  be calculated relative to this surface. Oppositely, SPF involves the use of
econometric estimation techniques to estimate a parametric frontier. The first authors to
estimate a production frontier were Aigner and Chu (1968). Their production function
incorporated a non-negative asymmetric error term, which showed a distance from the frontier
for a given firm (Coelli et al. 2005).
In Vietnam, most studies focused on developing economic indicators for the offshore fisheries
in Khanh Hoa Province as well as finding main factors influencing the vessel performance
represented by gross revenue and (or) income (Kim Anh et al. (2006), Kim Anh et al. (2007),
Thanh Thuy et al. (2008) and Long et al. (2008)). Some of the research projects concentrated
on analyzing efficiency for the fisheries (Ngoc et al. (2009), Truong et al. (2011)). These
authors contributed useful insights for fishery managers to improve and develop fisheries
sector in Vietnam. For Kim Anh et al. (2006), the authors conducted the study of costs and
earnings of gillnet vessels in Nha Trang, Vietnam in 2004 and 2005. The empirical results
found that tuna-mackerel gillnet fishery was one of the offshore fisheries with relatively high
economic efficiency. The return on equity ratio (ROE) in 2004 and 2005 were 10.9 % and
17.9% respectively. The main reasons for that were all presumably abundant in fish stock and
increasing in market demands for Tuna and  Mackerel.
Both studies of Long et al. (2008) and Thanh Thuy et al. (2008) had the same characteristics of
methodology since economic performance indicators were based on gross revenue, gross value
added, gross cash flow, net profit and profit margin. When calculating net profit, both these
studies did not include opportunity cost of capital. The results of Long et al. (2008) showed
that  the average  annual  crew  remuneration  was  93%  of  labour  earnings  in  the  most
productive sectors in Khanh Hoa and the owner of an average longline performer got a profit
margin of 12.1%. In addition, the regression analysis of gross revenue and income indicated
that if other  factors hold constant, a vessel of hull  length 15.9 and 15.1m would maximize
gross revenue and income respectively. This implied that overinvestment in vessels could lead
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to inefficiency in Khanh Hoa’s longliners. For Thanh Thuy et al. (2008), the authors carried
out the study of costs and earnings of small-scale purse seiners  in  two  fishing  communities
(Nha Trang and Cam Ranh) in  Khanh Hoa  province  in 2005. The results demonstrated that
an average small-scale purse seiner was able to cover its all costs including depreciation and
interest payment, and earned a profit margin  of 24% and a return on investment of 30%. The
income of crew members was higher than that in the local seafood processing companies in the
province.
Ngoc, et al. (2009) used SPF to evaluate efficiency of trawlers that affected by a marine
protected area in Nha Trang Bay, Vietnam. The study showed that efficiency varried with the
fishing grounds. The vessels fishing in the vicinity of the Nha Trang Bay Marine Protect Area
(NTB-MPA) was higher level of efficient than those in an unprotected area. In addition, the
authors also concluded that an MBA did not seem to be sufficient to obtain improved
management. It was very important to deal with the link between poverty and resource





4.1.1. Open access bioeconomic model of the fishery
The traditional bioeconomic model of a fishery has been provided by Gordon, 1954. This
model was built based on the important assumptions that the vessel fleets in a perfectly
competitive market are homogeneous with an identical cost structure. Hence, all vessels have
the same of cost per unit of effort, or, marginal cost and  average cost are identical and
constant. Market prices are assumed not to be affected by the quantity of fish landed from this
one fishery. For simplicity, total costs may be supposed to increase linearly with efforts, and
the vertical distance between total revenue and total cost will define the economic profit from
the  fishery (Gordon.,1954).





















The total revenue curve will simply have the same shape as the sustainable yield curve,
scaled up or down depending on the actual price and price of fish is constant over time
(Flaaten., 2011). Under an open-access regime, vessels will enter the fishery if average
revenue per unit of effort  is greater  than average cost per unit, and will exit  the sector if  the
average cost per unit  is higher than average revenue per unit. When average revenue of effort,
AR(E), equals marginal cost of effort, MC(E), there will be an economic equilibrium with
neither an  incentive to leave nor an  incentive to enter the fishery. In other words, profit at
this effort level is zero (Flaaten, 2011). In Figure 4.1, the level of effort under open access
equilibrium is denoted as EOA. When the vessels operate at lower levels of open-access effort,
individuals will be making economic profits (resource rent). The existence of this positive
profits (or called in term of super normal profits) will attract new entrants into the fishery,
and lead to reducing the fisheries average revenue until individuals earning zero profits
(called in terms of normal profits) (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999;  Flaaten,  2011). As a result, the
resource rent will be dissipated under open access condition (Gordon, 1954;  Scott, 1955;
Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2011). This is a consequence of the “Tragedy of the
Commons” problem discussed in Hardin (1968).
4.1.2. Optimal economic management
In the case of maximum economic yield, the  level of effort, EMEY, is determined at a point
where MC(E) = MR(E). The economic profit generated at  this effort  level will be TRMEY –
TCMEY (Flaaten, 2011). These profits are called resource rent. The existence of the resource
rent is as a result of the fisheries management regimes. The figure 4.1 shows that EMEY is
significantly lower than EMSY. The reduction of effort compared with the open access effort
level saves costs and/or enlarges fishery revenues and maintains a large stock (Flaaten, 2011).
As mentioned above, the potential resource rent is wasted under open access equilibrium. It
occurs in the state of uncontrolled or unmanaged exploitation of a common property resource.
In addition, there are few incentives for each fisher  to save fish in the sea to let it grow and to
let it spawn new recruits for later periods of fishing because there is no assurance that the fish
they save would not be caught, either now or in the future, by competing fishermen (Scott,
1955; Flaaten, 2011). This has led to conditions of excessive exploitation and ecological
degradation. Thus, unrestricted access to a fishery leads to inefficiency and overfishing.
Therefore, public regulation of marine fisheries appears necessary to overcome the incentives
to overfish and its consequences. The economists’early discussions about regulations to
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achieve objectives, such as increase yields,  maximize  resource  rent,  or maintain
biodiversity. But they focused on normative issues such as: how can regulations be designed
in order to move an open access fishery closer to a rent maximizing ideal? (Homans and
Wilen, 1995).
To achieve the above objectives, fisheries managers have used traditional methods such as
managing fishing capacity and effort. Examples of management instruments for capacity and
effort reductions include vessel and fisher licences, effort quotas, length and weight limits for
hull and fitted vessels, as well as engine power limitations. Such regulations are called input
regulations. Output regulations related to the harvest of fish by setting a total allowable catch
(TAC) which is then sub-divided into individual quotas such as harvest quotas per enterprise,
vessel or fisher. In addition, input and output regulations may be combined with technical
regulations, which include minimum mesh size of gear, minimum size of fish, and closed
areas and seasons. Some of the regulatory instruments may be transformed into market
instruments, such as tradeable licences and quotas. Indirect management instruments include
taxes, fees and subsidies (Flaaten, 2011). Given the different ecological and socioeconomic
consequences of a common property resource, a number of fisheries managers’ efforts have
sought to improve management in the hope of moving towards sustainable marine fisheries
(Pauly et al., 2002).
4.1.3. Fishing vessel economics
In this section, the author will apply microeconomic theory to the operation of fish harvesting
firms in order to study on the economic adaptation of fishing vessels (Flaaten, 2011). This
includes the economic objectives of fishing  activities, the costs structure,  the size and the
availability of natural resources, and the fish stock. A fishing effort measures the activity
level of a vessel. The vessels can be different in effort levels due to the differences in the total
number inputs needed to generate fishing efforts (Flaaten, 2011).
 In the previous section we assumed that vessels are homogenous with respect to cost and
catchability implying that cost per unit of effort, a, is constant and equal for all vessels
(Flaaten, 2011). In actual fisheries vessels usually differ with respect to efficiency and costs.
For example, a fishing fleet is characterized with the differences in size, age, engine power,
or the difference in the skill of the skipper and crew (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten,
2011). Thus, the fishing vessels are heterogeneous in cost structure and variations in the
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efficiency of efforts. This lead to the existence of  heterogeneous  efforts  in the fish
harvesting industry.
Before analyzing the vessel’s economic adaptation of fishing effort, there are some
assumptions need to be showed. It is firstly assumed that each vessel is not able to impact on
market price of fish in the competitive market due to the catch of a vessel is small in relation
to the total landings of fish in this market. This is reasonable to consider that the price of fish
is the same for all vessels. It is secondly assumed that the activity of the vessel has not effect
on stock biomass, and fish stock is considered as constant in the short-run (Flaaten, 2011). In
a given period of time the vessel’s harvest function is a function of its effort. For simplicity,
we assume that the vessel harvest function is the Schaefer harvest function:
(4.1)       h (e,X) = qeX
where e is effort of one fishing vessel, given the stock level, X, and the catchability
coefficiency, q.
The total cost of effort is tc(e) = tvc(e) + f, where tvc(e) is total variable cost of effort and f is
the fixed cost. The average cost is calculated by total cost divided by the effort, ac(e) = tc(e)/e
and marginal cost of vessel effort is the addition to total cost due to the addition of one unit to
effort, mc(e) = dtc(e)/de.
According to the theory of the firm, marginal cost may decline with output at low level,
reaches a minimum, and rises thereafter, due to the form of the production function. In the
case of fisheries, effort is considered as the (intermediate) product of  the  production  process
and  this  (intermediate)  product  is  produced  by  regular  inputs according  to a  regular
production  function (Flaaten, 2011).
Using the Schaefer harvest function, the profit of the vessel is:
п (e;X) = p h(e,X) – tc(e)
or
(4.2) п (e;X) = p qeX – tc(e)
Assuming that the objective of the vessel is to maximize its profit given in equation (4.2), the
first order condition for this is
(4.3) П’(e,X) = pqX – mc(e) = 0
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Equation (4.3) implies the following criterion for the vessel’s adaptation of its effort is that
(4.4)      mc(e) = pqX
This equation (4.4) shows that the marginal cost of vessel effort is equal to the marginal
revenue of effort. The latter equals the product of fish price, catchability coefficient and stock
level. The result represents the revenue earned by the adding one unit of effort. In the
traditional theory of production or theory of the firm, the right hand side of the equation
corresponding  to (4.4) would include only p, whereas in this case both q and X are included
in addition to the price. For a given set of p, q and X the vessel’s optimal effort is  implicitly
given by equation  (4.4) (Flaaten, 2011).
In the production theory, we can measure product along the horizontal axis whereas in this
case we have used fishing effort as the fisher’s decision variable. An ordinary firm can
control its total production process, including all inputs needed and the costs incurred. A fish-
harvesting firm, however, does not control it’s the most important  input, especially the fish
stock. Fish stock is not the same as fuel and bait that can be purchased in the input market.
Thus cost per unit  of  harvest will  depend  on  both  input  costs  and  on  the  stock  level
and  its catchability (Flaaten, 2011).
Figure 4.2.  Two fishing vessels: short-run adaptation of effort for given cost structure, price
of fish, catchability and stock level. Source: Ola Flaaten, (2011, p.93).
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We will compare the adaptation of optimal effort for two profit maximising vessels, vessel i
and vessel j ( shown in figure 4.2)
Panel (a) of  this figure shows  the marginal revenue of effort, pqX, for two levels of the fish
stock, namely X and 1X . The optimal effort of vessel i is

ie for stock level X . This effort
is according to the optimality criterion in equation (4.4), that is, marginal cost of effort equals
marginal revenue of effort. In this case, vessel i does not make any profit, just remains break-
even, since the marginal revenue of effort, pqX , equals average variable cost.
If the stock level is lower than X , it will be optimal for this vessel to stop fishing because
marginal revenue will be below the minimum average cost at any effort level. In this case, the
lost of vessel will be more than fixed cost, it is better for the vessel to be idle with zero
revenue and zero cost, than to operate with a negative result. The vessel i is called as a
marginal vessel.
Figure 4.2 panel (b) shows that vessel j achieves its maximal profit for effort je  at stock
level X and that profit equals the area ABCD in this case. This profit is called producer’s
surplus or quasi rent in the theory of the firm and  intra-marginal rent in fisheries economic
theory1. The latter refers to rent earned by those vessels that are more cost efficient than the
marginal vessel. In figure 4.2 vessel i is a marginal vessel at stock level X whereas vessel j
is intra-marginal at this level (Flaaten, 2011).





respectively. In this case, the profit for each of these two vessels will equal the single-shaded
areas of panel (a) and (b). From this, we can see that higher stock level means higher
marginal revenue of effort, thus encouraging each vessel to increase its effort. The increase of
vessel effort depends on the steepness of the marginal cost curve. If the marginal cost curve is
very steep the optimal effort will hardly be expanded if stock increases (Flaaten, 2011).
1 Sometimes intra-marginal rent refers to rent related to the average total cost curve. However, the main point is
that intra-marginal rent is a surplus that accrues to those vessels that are more cost efficient than the marginal
one.
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Figure 4.3 shows behavior of the individual fishing vessel for its adaptation in short run and
long run. In the short-run, the vessel suffices to cover operation cost (variable cost) whereas
in the long-run it has to cover both fixed and variable cost. (Flaaten, 2011).
Figure 4.3.  Short-run and long-run adaptation of fishing effort may vary due to fixed costs.
Source: Ola Flaaten, (2011, p.95).
Note that the average variable cost curve, avc(e), is below the average total cost curve, atc(e),
at any effort level, however, the difference between average total cost and average variable
cost narrows when effort expands since this allows the fixed cost to be divided by more units
of effort. The marginal cost curve intersects the avc(e) and atc(e) curves at their minimum
points (Flaaten, 2011).
 In the short-run a vessel will operate if stock level above XM or marginal revenue of effort is
above pqXM, which is equal to the minimum of its average variable cost. In the long-run,  a
vessel will also have to cover fixed costs, it means that the stock level has to be at or above
X  or the marginal revenue of effort is equal or greater than pq X  for the vessel to be able
to cover its capital cost. The X  indicates that the stock level at which the marginal vessel
breaks even under open-access fishing regime (Flaaten, 2011). The marginal vessel,
producing effort e , will be able to cover all its costs, and earning normal profit. However, if
effective management measures have been taken, the stock level is kept at X1 , the vessels
will earn the gross profit is area of ABEF which include the super profit DCEF shown in
figure 4.3. The super profit in this case is the vessel’s share of resource rent (Flaaten, 2011).
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4.1.4. Intra-marginal rent for the most efficient vessels
In section 4.1.1 we assumed that vessels are homogeneous from a cost and efficiency point of
view. From this section we also see that the potential resource rent is wasted in an open-
access fishery, but that sole ownership or other management measures can mitigate this and
create resource rent.  In actual fisheries vessels usually vary with respect to size, engine
power, gear-type, costs and other technical and economic characteristics. Therefore, the
fishing vessels are heterogeneous in cost structure and different in efficiency of effort, and
resulting in the existence of heterogeneous effort in the fishery (Flaaten, 2011).
Figure 4.4 illustrates relationship between the standardized effort and the cost efficiency of
the effort of 12 heterogeneous vessels. For each of the 12 vessels, the standardized effort  is
along the horizontal axis and the average cost per unit standardized effort is with the vertical
axis. The standardized fishing effort of each vessel is measured by the width of the bar
whereas the height of the bar measures cost per unit effort. The vessels are arranged from the
left to the right according to their cost efficiency, with vessel number 1 as the most cost
efficient one and vessel number 12 as the least cost efficient. Since the cost bars in Figure 4.4
are substituted by a curve enveloping the bars, this curve is called the marginal cost of effort
curve, MC(E), and is shown in figure 4.5 panel (b) (Flaaten, 2011).
Figure 4.4. Relationship between the standardized fishing effort and the cost efficiency of the
effort in heterogeneous vessels. Source: Flaaten (2011, p.108)
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In figure 4.4 panel (b), the marginal cost of effort curve is increasing with respect to the
increase of fishing effort of the fishery. Based on the above fundamental principle of the
traditional bioeconomic model, under open access, vessels will enter the fishery if the
average revenue per unit effort is greater than the marginal cost of effort, and exit the fishery
if revenue is less than cost. So, open-access equilibrium is found where MC(E) = AR(E), for
effort level X . For the effort level E   the total revenue equals the square AGOE  and the
total cost equals the area of ADOE   .This implies that there is an economic surplus in the
fishery, equivalent to the area AGD, or the line segment R in figure 4.5 panel (a) since
AGOE   > ADOE  . This surplus is called intra-marginal rent or producer’s surplus
2. This
rent accrues to those vessels that have lower costs than the marginal vessels at E  . In this
case, with a progressively increasing TC(E) curve, the equilibrium point is to the left of the
intersection between the TR(E) and the TC(E) curves, the difference between them being the
intra-marginal rent (Flaaten, 2011).
Figure 4.5. Equilibrium fishing effort, resource rent and intra-marginal rent under open-
access and under maximum economic yield management in the case of heterogeneous effort.
Source: Flaaten (2011, p.109)
























Overall, the intra-marginal rent is generated from the existence of heterogeneous vessels, of
which the most cost efficient vessels make above normal profits (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999;
Flaaten, 2011). This is in contrast to the case of homogeneous vessels in which rent equals
zero. Thus, this can indicate that the profits still generated even under open access regime.
4.2. The concepts of costs and earnings
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the assessment of economic performance is a key
element in furthering the understanding of the economic incentives that exist in the fishery. In
this study, we develope economic performance indicators based on costs and earnings of
purse seine vessels in Nha Trang, Vietnam in 2011. The  concepts  of  costs  and earnings are
based on those of profitability analyses of fishing vessels in industrialized countries (Flaaten
et al., 1995).
The calculation of economic performance indicators is presented as follows:
Gross Revenue
- Variable costs (except labour cost)
= Income
- Fixed cost
= Gross value added
- Labour cost
= Gross cash flow
- Depreciation
- Interest payment on loans
= Profit
- Calculated interest on owner’s
capital
= Net profit (rent)
Gross revenue is defined as landing value of the vessel in year of fishing operations. It is the
result of the average revenue of each trip multiplied by the number of fishing trips in the year
2011.
Variable costs are total expenses for all fishing trips in year, except labor costs. They include
costs for fuel, lubricant, ice, provisions, minor repair in one fishing year. They are the result
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of the average vessel variable cost per fishing trip times the number of fishing trips in the
year 2011.
Income is defined as the difference between gross revenue and variable costs, except labor
cost
Fixed cost is the total of annual repair and maintenance costs of boat, engine, fishing gear,
and other equipments on the vessel, and insurance for vessels and all crew members and
registration fee. Fixed cost does not change with the number of fishing trips taken in the
fishing year 2011.
Gross value added (GVA) is referred to as the difference between the annual gross revenue
minus the total of annual variable costs and fixed cost, excluding labor costs. In other words,
GVA is the total of labor cost, depreciation, interest payments, calculated  interest on owner’s
capital and net profit.
Gross cash flow is an important indicator of economic performance. It is specified by gross
value added less labor cost or it refers to as the gross revenue minus all expenses, except
depreciation, loan interests and calculated  interest on  owner’s  capital.
Profit is the remaining value after deducting depreciation and interest payment on loans
(except the calculated interest on owner’s capital) from gross cash flow.
Net profit is calculated as the gross revenue less all expenses, including the calculated interest
on owner’s capital. Thus, it is considered as an actual net reward after all factors of
production have received their compensation.
Depreciation is calculated as the actual loss in the value of the assets over time, that is not
offset by repairs and maintenance over the period due to wear and tear (Pascoe, Robinson and
Coglan, 1996). In this study, the author use straight-line depreciation because of limited
information in the data set. The depreciation is calculated basing on the fixed capital value
which is to be valued at current prices. This means that assets acquired in earlier period
(historic prices) have to be revalued in order to convert them into 2011 prices (OECD, 2001).
In this case, the depreciation rate3 is estimated basing information on the age, current value
and current replacement cost of each item (Elizabeth Clark et al., 2006/07).
3An allowance for depreciation of a capital item was estimated using the formula (R-C)/A where R =
replacement cost of the item, C = current value of the item and A = age of the item in years.
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Interest payment on loans is costs for payment of loan interest in year. The rate of interest on
loans has differences among the vessel owners because of a non-perfect capital market as
Vietnam.
There are various loan sources for fishermen with the unfair price. These sources can come
from their relatives, midle-men, or Vietnam’s commercial banks. Thus, the loan interest
should be deducted before the profit (Duy, 2010).
The calculated interest on owner’s capital is referred to as the opportunity cost of the owner’s
capital in the year of the profitability analysis (2011). Whitmarsh et al. (2000) showed that
“the opportunity cost of capital is based on what the capital invested in the vessel would have
earned in the next best alternative investment”. In this study, the calculated interest on
owner’s capital is counted as the vessel owner’s capital  multiplied by the annual bank
deposit interest rate. For this fishing year, the interest rate is 14% per annum 4. The vessel
owner’s capital is defined as the asset value at the time of the calculation minus the loans in
the year 2011.
Profit margin is referred to as ratio of profit (before the opportunity cost of owner’s capital
but after depreciation and interest payment on loans) to gross revenue. This ratio expresses
what is left as compensation to the vessel owner’s capital in relation to gross revenue as
percentage of gross revenue.
The return on investment (ROI) is defined is defined as ratio of profit to owner’s capital of the
vessel. This ratio shows what is left to the vessel owner as compensation to the opportunity
cost of owner’s capital in relation to owner’s capital of the vessel as percentage of owner’s
capital of the vessel.
4.3. Econometrical model
4.3.1. Model of annual vessel production
In this study, annual vessel production is chosen for further analysis. The author want to
investigate “what are the main determinants of annual vessel production”. In this case,  the
output is a physical measure of volume. However, Vietnamese fisheries are characterised by
mixed outputs due to different species in the catch.  Hence, the value of catch is a common
4This information is available from the annual reports of the State Bank of Vietnam
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proxy for output when multi-species fisheries are examined. (Ngoc et al, 2009; Pascoe and
Mardle, 2003). Cunningham and Whitmarsh (1980) also stated that “Catch is measured in
monetary terms it often gives a better fit to the data” even though for biological objectives.
The authors explained that skippers, in fact, were more concerned about revenue than
biomass and therefore, value of catch correlated better with inputs than weight of caught
(Cunningham and Whitmarsh, 1980). Thus, the analysis of annual production is implemented
by performing regression analysis of the proxy, annual gross revenue.
The production function of each vessel adopted by the Cobb-Douglas production function. It
was used validly in many studies of the fisheries sector, such as the studies of Comitini and
Huang (1967), Hannesson (1983), Taylor and Prochaska (1985), Campbell (1991), Padilla
and Trinidad (1995) (Duy., 2010). The main inputs used in the production process often are
capital, capital utilisation, labour utilisation and fish stock (Kirkleyet al., 1995; Sharma and
Leung, 1999; Grafton et al., 2000; Pascoe and Coglan, 2002) (Ngoc et al., 2009). This is
broadly in keeping with traditional economic production theory, where output is assumed to
be a function of land (i.e. stock), labour and capital (Pascoe and Mardle., 2003). The level of
capital employed in the fishery can be measured in terms of monetary investments or in terms
of physical inputs (boat size, engine power) (Pascoe and Mardle., 2003; Ngoc et al.,2009).
Capital utilisation can be measured in terms of either days fished or fuel use (Pascoe and
Mardle, 2003). Pascoe et al. (2003) found that economic measures of capital were also
subject to measurement errors. They emphasised that physical measures were generally more
robust (in terms of measurement), and are often more readily available.
In this study, by using a log linear function. The returns to the inputs also can be measured by
output elasticities (FAO.,2003). The functional form of the model can be given by:
Ln(Revenuei) = β0 + β1 ln(HPi) + β2ln(Crewsizei) + β3ln(daysi) + β4Dlocation+ ε
Where the output is annual vessel gross revenue. The physical inputs – horsepower and
number of fishing days are used as proxy measures of capital invested and capital utilisation
in the fisheries. The crew size is the number of crew members employed per vessel for a
fishing trip, including the captain. It is included in the model as a variable input. In addition,
a dummy variable is used to distinguish how the characteristic of locations can affect revenue,
with 1 for island  and 0 for mainland. ε is random error term.
Initially, other inputs that are skipper’experience and gear-length were also considered as
factors affecting gross revenue. However, they were excluded from the final model because
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they neither individually nor jointly provided any evidence to support their statistically
significant effects on gross revenue of the vessel. As a result, engine power, number of crews,
number of fishing days and dummy variable for location are identified as the main factors
affecting the gross revenue of the vessel. In this model, the magnitudes of these beta
coefficients allow us to compare the contribution of each explanatory variable in the
prediction of the gross revenue. It is expected  that  the  signs  of  all estimated parameters are
positive. They are explained by some reasons below.
Engine power is correlated to the gross revenue due to the higher engine capacities, the more
quickly  vessels  can  travel  between  the  fishing  ports  and  fishing grounds, thus, have
more time for fishing. Besides, the highest possible speed is desired to prevent the active fish
school from escaping, and to reduce the influence of wind drift and water current on the
operation. In addition, the increase in engine power of fishing vessel is relevant to the
expansion of the average size of vessel length. In fact, vessels with higher length may carry
larger volume. This lead to enhance the probability of catching more fish (Parente,  2004). So,
it is expected that engine power has a positive effects on gross revenue of the vessel.
Average crew size is the next operational characteristic that impact on gross revenue. In many
econometric models of fisheries production function and frontiers include crew numbers as a
variable input (e.g. Squires, 1987; Kirkley, Squires and Strand, 1995, 1998) (Pascoe and
Mardle, 2003), on the basis that bigger crews result in greater output levels due to more crew
enable the catch to be removed and processed more quickly, allowing more hauls to take
place over a given period of time. Hence, it is expected that crew size has a positive effects
on gross revenue of the vessel.
Fishing days is calculated as actual fishing time of each vessel. This would involve the time
spent on searching for fish, looking for fishing  grounds,  preparing the fishing  gear,  and
harvesting. When the fishing time increases, the total catch in year will increase accordingly.
The total amount of catch is highly correlated to the actual fishing time (FAO,  2003a). So, it
is expected that fishing days has a positive relationship with gross revenue.
A dummy variable for location helps to distinguish how the characteristics of locations can
affect revenue, with 1 for the island and 0 for the mainland areas
4.3.2. Model of of standardised fishing effort
In the fisheries, effort is an abstract concept that is defined as the combined effect of the
inputs used in fishing, including fixed components of vessel and variable components. It
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includes many  factors  such  as  length  of vessel,  horse  power,  fishing  time,  a  number  of
gears  or  a  number  of  boats,  the  skill  of skippers  and  crew,  etc  (FAO,  2003).
Cunningham and Whitmarsh (1980) found that there are two terms of fishing effort: the first
is nominal fishing effort (i.e. total time spent fishing) referred to as the volume of resource
devoted to fishing, quantified in monetary or physical units, the second is effective fishing
effort (in terms of fishing power of the vessel) defined as the biomass of fish extracted by
fishing expressed as a proportion of the mean population size or in other words, effective
fishing effort can be considered as fishing mortality (Cunningham and Whitmarsh.,1980).
FAO (2003) also showed that the fixed input stocks which make up the capacity base (capital
base) whereas the variable inputs such as days fished or days at sea, which represents the
combination of inputs applied to the capacity base to generate catch. In short term, the
vessel’s main characteristics such as weight, length, engine power are fixed, while effort
measured in days and hour of fishing (nominal fishing effort) is flexible. However, this
nominal effort may depend on the vessel’s technical characteristics that are built before,
which all they generate total fishing effort (Flaaten, 2011)
Obviously thus it is very difficult to know the exact formulation to measure a fishing  effort
because we need base on biological and economic characteristics of the fishery (Padilla at al.,
1995). In all fisheries, there are fishing vessels of many different shapes and sizes, using
different kinds of equipment and fishing gear. To obtain a meaningfull expression of fishing
effort, the effort of various kinds of boats must be standadized (OECD., 2006).
In this study, the standardized fishing effort for vessels will be estimated by fishing effort the
production function approach to effort. From the Schaefer harvest function in equation (4.1)
we can rewrite:
(4.5) h (e,X) = 11  Xqe  (with 1 = 2 =1)
where h is the produced catch, e is effort of each fishing vessel, given the stock level, X, and
the catchability coefficiency, q is a constant.
 The product of fish harvesting firms, is a function of effort and stock and this can be
expressed in the general form of the production function is:
(4.6)  h = f (e, X)
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With cross-sectional data for one year, we assume that stock level is constant. This
assumption implies that the production function is separable. Hence, the production function
can be expressed by:
(4.7) h = f (g(x), X)
Where e = g(x) and x is a vector of inputs. The separability generating the form of equation
(4.7) is shown in the studies of Squires (1987), Campbell (1991), and Padilla and Trinidad
(1995) (Duy., 2010). Hence, the effort function of each vessel, g(x), can be given by the form
of Cobb-Douglas function:
(4.8) EFFORT = g (x1, x2,…, xn) = A nnxxx
 ...21 21
Where iEFFORT  is the standardized fishing effort of vessel i , ix  is factor i  of the vessel
and A is a constant.
As you can see, this production function is similar in the theory of the firm. However, the
great difference is that effort is not a final product to be sold, like the products of most firms,
but an intermediate good produced to encounter the fish stock (Flaaten, 2011).
Based on the characteristics of the fishery, this study uses engine capacity (measured in
horsepower) and the number of fishing days in a year as proxies for capital invested and
capital utilisation, the crew size as the proxy for variable input. All this explanatory variables
are identified as key factors affecting fishing effort of the vessel. From equation 4.8, the log-
linear effort model for vessel i can be written as follows:
iiiii uDaysCrewsizeHPEFFORT  )ln()ln()ln(ln 3210 
Where HP is horse power of vessel, the Crew size is the number of crew employed per vessel
and Days is number of fishing days of vessel, iu  is the random error term and subscript
shows vessel i .
In the fisheries, fish caught per unit of time is often used as a measure of effective fishing
effort (Cunningham and Whitmarsh,1980; Duy, 2010). However, by assuming that the prices
of fish are fixed and the same for all vessels and months within one year, annual gross
revenue  is considered to be a proxy for fishing effort due to lack of catch volume data for
each vessel. In model (4.9), the returns to the variable inputs also can be measured by output
elasticities (FAO, 2003b). We expect that 121  , 03  . With this log linear function,
(4.9)
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the elasticities can be estimated by using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  regression. The
econometric package EVIEWS version 5.1 is used.
This fishing effort measure is often standardised to represent differences in relative fishing
power, because vessels often vary with engine capacity, hull length and, fishing days. Such
standardized measures of the relative performance of different boats compensate for
heterogeneity in the fleet (FAO, 2003b). Hence, in this study, the relative standardised effort
will be used instead of the fishing effort for all vessels.
Adapting the definition of relative fishing power by Beverton and Holt (1957), the relative
standardized fishing effort of vessel i can be given by:
EFFORTEFFORTe ii /
where ie  is the relative standardized fishing effort of vessel i ; EFFORT  is an average
standardized effort of all vessels (Duy., 2010)
Calculating the relative standardized effort also gives us the indices of the relative fishing
power (RFP) (Duy., 2010). The difference in relative standardised effort can be expressed as
the difference in the relative fishing power efficiency of the vessels. The ratio of cost to
relative standardized effort reflects the cost efficiency of the vessel. From this ratios, we can
find out what vessel group have the most cost efficiency by using Salter diagram software.
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Chapter 5
 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
5.1. Data Collection
Data for this study was collected from a survey of cost and earnings as well as the technical
and operational characteristics of purse seine fishery in Nha Trang city, Khanh Hoa province
in 2011. The sample was collected randomly with a sample size of 62 anchovy purse seiners,
representing about 46 % of such vessels in Nha Trang (see table 5.2). The author collected
data for this year, the questionnaire is designed by Prof. Ola Flaaten, Dr. Khanh Ngoc Thi
Quach, PhD student Thanh Thuy Thi Pham and MSc. Duy Ngoc Nguyen. This questionnaire
was applied for some previous studies on the economic performance indicators of the
fisheries in Khanh Hoa (see Thanh Thuy et al., 2008 and Luong., 2009). The standardised
questionnaire form is attached in the appendix A.
All surveys were conducted during mid - November to December in 2011 through face to
face interviews with vessel owner and/or his wife. In this period, the fishermen stopped
fishing to repair boats and nets for the new season. The high season for the anchovy purse
seine fishery stretches from March to August or September. The data consists of detailed
information on various aspects of purse seine fishery such as vessel technical characteristics,
number of trips per month and number of operating months in year, crew size, variable costs
per trip and fixed costs, gross revenue and other information.
In this study, the sample representativeness was tested because representative sample is a key
factor to determine the quality of the study. Hull length was selected to test since it is
available in the database of DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa and the data set of 62 purse seine
vessels. Unfortunately, we have only the 2010 database of Khanh Hoa purse seiners.
Therefore, assuming that the population of Khanh Hoa inshore purse seiners in 2011 is the
same as in 2010, the 2010 population of Khanh Hoa’s purse seine fleets is employed to test
for the representativeness of the 2011 sample. The test results in Table 5.1
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Hull length 62 14.29 1.15 14.07 1.51
Sources: aown data and calculations, bDECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2010)
In Table 5.1, an application of T-Test statistic for sample representativeness tests is
performed.  Selecting the level of significance of the test is   5%, then the critical values
of t distribution for this two-tail test are 2.5 percentile  t(0.975, 61)= 1.9996. This results show
that the sample size of 62 anchovy purse seiners is considered representative for Nha Trang’s
anchovy purse seine vessels. Hence, the sample in this study can be used as the reliable proxy
to represent for the whole population.
Table 5.2: The distribution of the anchovy purse-seine vessels in the sample by location
Ward Populationb Samplec
Rate of sample to
populationc
Vung Ngan Island 50 32 64.00%
Vinh Truong 29 10 34.48%
Vinh Nguyen 31 13 41.94%
Hon Ro 8 7 87.50%
Othera 16 0 0%
Total 134 62 46.27%
Notes: aother wards include Vinh Tho, Vinh Phuoc, Xuong Huan, Van Thanh and Ngoc Hiep;
bsource from DECAFIREP of Khanh Hoa (2010); csource from own data and calculations.
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5.2. Descriptive statistics of variables
Table 5.3 presents a summary of economic and technical data for 62 surveyed purse seiners
in 2011. The sample vessels are quite heterogeneous in terms of technical and operational
characteristics. Engine capacity ranged from 22 to 550 HP, with a mean of about 161.31 HP.
Hull length varied from 11.60 m to 15.90 m, with an average length of 14.29 m. The number
of  fishing days of the vessels in the year also ranged from 160 days to 215 days, with an
average about 198.65 days. The average crew size was 13.15 persons, with a range from 8 to
15 persons.
Table 5.3:  Descriptive statistics of 62 anchovy purse seiners in 2011
Criteria Mean S.D. Min Max
Engine Power (HP) 161.31 127.34 22.00 550.00
Hull length (m) 14.29 1.15 11.60 15.90
Number of fishing days (days) 198.65 13.18 160.00 215.00
Number of crew size (person) 13.15 1.76 8.00 15.00
Gross revenue 1762.26 519.34 800.00 2800.00
Variable costs 718.93 157.99 392.00 1042.75
Maintenance and repair costs 75.90 11.93 49.44 98.32
Insurance and registration fee 2.15 2.13 0.50 6.54
Labor cost 481.74 144.93 216.00 675.00
Drepreciation 139.08 50.31 33.33 215.00
Loan interest payment 35.19 17.67 3.70 55.50
Owner’s capital 732.65 200.53 300.00 1120.00
Calculated interest on owner’s capital 102.57 28.07 42.00 156.80
 Unit of measurement: million VND. Source: Own data and calculations
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Furthermore, table 5.3 also shows the important economic performance indicator of an
average purse seiner that is gross revenue and its costs including variable costs, maintain and
repair costs, insurance and registration costs, labor cost, and capital cost. Annual gross
revenue of the vessel varied from 800 million to 2,800 million VND, with an average of
1762.26 million VND. In the same year, although gross revenue increased, but the costs were
also very high corresponding due to the fuel price increse. The annual average variable costs
was of about 718.93 million VND with a wide range from 392.00 to 1042.75 million VND.
The labor cost also varied from 216 million to 675 million VND, with an average amount of
481.74 million VND.
In addition, an average depreciation of vessel in one year was 139.08 million VND, with a
range from 33.33 million to 215.00 million VND. These costs are determined by the
information on the age, current value and current replacement cost of vessels. The average
maintenance and repair costs was 75.90 million VND, with a range from 49.44 million to
98.32 million VND. The average  loan  interest payment was 35.19 million, with a range
from 3.70 million to 55.50 million VND. Finally, owner’s capital and calculated  interest on
owner’s capital for an average vessel were 732.65 million VND (with a range from 300.00
million to 1120.00 million VND) and 102.57 million VND (from 42.00 million to 156.80
million VND) respectively. In this study, the vessel owner’s capital is defined as the asset
value at the time of the calculation minus the loans. The calculated interest on owner’s capital
is counted as the vessel owner’s capital  multiplied by the annual bank deposit interest  rate,
which is at 14% in 2011 (The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), 2011).
Table 5.4 presents a comparison of the economic and technical data between vessel groups of
the anchovy purse seiners, which are categorized based on engine capacity. These three
vessel groups are quite heterogeneous in terms of technical and operational characteristics.
Almost figures show that larger mean values in the groups with greater engine capacities. For
the vessel group with the engine capacity of less than 90 HP, the average length of this vessel
group was 13.12 m; the average fishing days of 192 days per year and the average crew size
was 11.70 persons. For the vessel group with the engine capacity from 90 to 250 HP was
higher than those of the vessel group with the engine capacity of less than 90 HP. The last
vessel group with engine capacity greater than 250 HP had a mean vessel length of 15.27m;
the number of fishing days of 205.67 days and the average crew size of 14.25 persons.
Table 5.3 also describes the average economic variables for each of the three vessel groups.
The gross revenues of these three vessel groups, ranging from the smallest to the largest
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engine capacity, were 1185.50 million, 1855.00 million and 2491.67 million VND
respectively. The average costs (including variable costs, maintain and repair costs, insurance
and registration costs, labor cost and capital cost) also increased with engine sizes. The vessel
groups with higher engines had the average costs higher than those of vessel groups with
smaller engines.
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of three vessel groups in 2011
Range of engine power
     HP<90      90<=HP<=250            HP>250
     (n=20) (n=30)             (n=12)
Criteria
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Engine Power (HP) 53.60 15.54 144.33 49.11 383.25 86.82
Hull length (m) 13.12 0.91 14.69 0.77 15.27 0.57
Number of fishing days (days) 192.00 16.21 200.27 10.33 205.67 9.34
Number of crew size (person) 11.70 1.69 13.67 1.37 14.25 1.22
Gross revenue 1185.50 189.31 1855.00 236.48 2491.67 278.66
Variable costs 553.05 88.72 752.92 83.78 910.41 114.64
Maintenance and repair costs 62.67 6.87 79.21 6.71 89.65 5.90
Insurance and registration fee 1.65 1.88 1.79 1.75 3.86 2.64
Labor  cost 318.95 69.14 530.20 101.87 631.88 41.08
Drepreciation 81.52 24.73 153.87 30.09 198.04 13.51
Loan interest payment 16.29 10.26 30.24 16.87 48.29 8.13
Owner’s capital 497.50 112.41 822.47 104.88 900.00 138.15
Calculated interest on owner’s capital 69.65 15.74 115.15 14.68 126.00 19.34
Unit of measurement: million VND
Source: Own data and calculations
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Chapter 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1. Economic performance indicators
Table 6.1 presents the most important economic performance indicators for an average purse
seiner in 2011 including gross revenue, income, gross value added, gross cash flow profit and
net profit. The results show that these indicators are positive for an average vessel. The average
income of the vessel after deducting all variable costs (not including labour cost) was estimated
at 1043.33 million VND, with a wide range from 406.25 million to 1757.25 million VND. The
average annual gross value added of the vessels was largely varied from 349.03 million to
1664.02 million VND, with a mean of 965.29 million VND. The next is an indicator of gross
cash flow. This indicator is considered as a good short-term indicator in fisheries. In this case,
the annual gross cash flow of the vessels, on average, was 483.55 million VND with a wide
range from 47.45 million to 989.08 million VND. This result means that the vessel owners
were able to pay for all their operational costs. In addition to the results, the average annual
vessel profit was estimated at 330.85 million VND, with a range from -23.88 to 723.58  million
VND and the average vessel net profit after deducting the opportunity cost of owner’s capital
was 228.28 million VND. This indicator varied greatly from -65.88 to 583.58 million VND.
Consequently, the vessel owner of an average anchovy purse seiner was able to cover all of the
costs and had a significant reward for the operating year.
The ratios of the most of the important indicators are also shown in Table 6.1, the averages of
vessels’profit margin and return on investment were 17.41% and 42.45% respectively, with
wide ranges for both indicators. These ratios are higher than the annual bank deposit interest
rate, which is at 14% in 2011 (The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), 2011). Consequently, the
purse seine fishery may continue expanding as well as attracting additional vessels to this
fishery in the near future. For fishermen’s income, this table also presents the labor cost was,
on average, about 481.74 million VND. The crew size was 13.15 persons for an average
purse seiner. Thus, the average annual crew share of about 36.63  million VND and the
average crew share per month was about 3.05 million VND, the average annual income per
crew member was about 36.63 million VND, which is about 2% more than that of other
people in Khanh Hoa province (GSO of Khanh Hoa, 2011) and about 26.86 % higher than the
2011 national average income per capita (GSO, 2012).As mentioned above, the crew
remuneration also included all crews, skipper in the income share system.
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Table 6.1: Economic performance indicators of 62 anchovy purse seiners in 2011
Criteria Minimum  Maximum Mean S.D.
Gross revenue 800.00 2800.00 1762.26 519.34
   Variable costs 392.00 1042.75 718.93 157.99
Income 406.25 1757.25 1043.33 376.34
  Fixed costs 50.43 102.16 78.04 12.69
Gross value added 349.03 1664.02 965.29 365.27
  Labour cost 216.00 675.00 481.74 144.93
Gross cash flow 47.45 989.08 483.55 254.03
  Depreciation 33.33 215.00 139.08 50.31
  Interest payment on loans 3.70 55.50 35.19 17.67
Profit -23.88 723.58 330.85 196.65
  Calculated interest on owner’s capital 42.00 156.80 102.57 28.07
Net profit -65.88 583.58 228.28 176.43
Profit margin -2.49% 28.05% 17.41% 6.59%
Return on investment (ROI) -7.96% 86.47% 42.45% 19.14%
Unit of measurement: million VND
Source: Own data and calculations
In addition, table 6.2 presents a comparison of some important economic performance indicators
between vessel groups of the anchovy purse seiners, which are categorized according to engine
capacity. In general, the results show that most annual performance indicators tend to increase
following the increasing of engine power. We can see that the vessel group with engine capacity of
less than 90 HP had an average gross cash flow of 249.18 million VND, translating into a profit of
161.96 million VND, the net profit after deducting the opportunity cost of owner’s capital of 92.31
million VND, a profit margin of 13.24%, and return on investment of 30.95%. For the vessel group with
the engine capacity from 90 to 250 HP was higher than those of the vessel group with the engine
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capacity of less than 90 HP. For the last vessel group with engine capacity greater than 250 HP, an
average gross cash flow, profit and net profit were 855.86 million VND, 609.54 million VND and
483.54 million VND respectively, the profit margin was 24.23% and  return  on  investment was
67.78%.
Table 6.2: Economic performance indicators among vessel groups in 2011




Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Gross revenue 1185.50 189.31 1855.00 236.48 2491.67 278.66
Variable costs 553.05 88.72 752.92 83.78 910.41 114.64
Income 632.45 125.17 1102.08 190.24 1581.26 175.83
Fixed costs 64.32 7.03 81.00 7.23 93.51 6.52
Gross value added 568.13 122.92 1021.08 186.27 1487.75 171.05
Labour cost 318.95 69.14 530.20 101.87 631.88 41.08
Gross cash flow 249.18 96.94 490.88 165.16 855.86 135.88
Depreciation 81.52 24.73 153.87 30.09 198.04 13.51
Interest payment on loans 16.29 10.26 30.24 16.87 48.29 8.13
Profit 161.96 81.70 331.97 139.37 609.54 122.94
  Calculated interest on
owner’s capital 69.65 15.74 115.15 14.68 126.00 19.34
Net profit 92.31 69.96 216.83 133.60 483.54 109.83
Profit margin 13.24% 5.75% 17.46% 5.97% 24.23% 2.79%
Return on investment (ROI) 30.95% 13.40% 39.99% 15.69% 67.78% 10.76%
Unit of measurement: million VND
Source: Own data and calculations
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In summary, as shown in Table 6.2, the results revealed that, on average, most vessels had
positive income, gross value added, gross cash flow, profit and net profit. The vessels groups
with higher engine powers had the economic performance indicators far better than those of
vessel groups with smaller engines in 2011. These positive results are very interesting in
terms of an open-access characteristics of this fishery. This may be explained by the theory of
the fishing vessel economics in an open access fishery. In the case of heterogeneous vessels,
we have seen that the most cost-efficient vessels make above-normal profits, called intra-
marginal rent. Therefore, these vessels may create net benefits for society (this explanation
will be demonstrated in the section 6.4).
6.2. Results of Econometrical model
6.2.1. Results of annual vessel production function
In this section, we present the results of the regression analysis of annual gross revenue for
Nha Trang’s anchovy purse seiners in 2011. This is performed by regression analysis of the
vessel’s gross revenue by means of some technical and operational characteristics of the
vessel, such as horse power (HP), crew size (Crewsize), the number of fishing days (Days)
and a dummy variable for location (Dlocation). The econometric package Eviews version 5.1
was used. Table 6.3 shows the results of the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation
Table 6.3: Parameter estimate and test statistics of gross revenue function
Estimated coefficient T-value P-value
Constant 2.2417 2.9098 0.0051a
ln(HP) 0.3105 18.8611 0.0000a
ln(Crewsize) 0.3107 3.9177 0.0002a
ln(Days) 0.5401 3.7092 0.0005a
Dlocation 0.0858 4.8709 0.0000a
R2 0.9543
F 297.5370 0.0000a
aStatistically significant at the level of 1%. Source: own data.
As shown in Table 6.3, the results indicate that the signs of all estimated coefficients are
positive as we expect and these coefficients are statistically different from zero at the level of
significance  = 0.01 or better. This means that horse power, crew size, fishing days and the
location of Nha Trang’s anchovy purse seiners have statistically significant effects on annual
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gross revenue. Furthermore, an application of the F- test for testing the overall significance of
the model. Since F-value =297.5370 with P- value = 0.0000, then at least one of the
parameters is not zero at the level of significance  = 0.01 or better. Thus, the estimated
model is significant at the 1% level. In addition, R2 = 0.9543 indicating that 95.43 % of the
variation in gross revenue is explained by the variation in horse power, by the variation in
crew size, by the variation in the number of days at sea and by location, in our sample, 4.57%
of the variation in revenue is left unexplained and is due to variation in the error term.  In this
case, the estimated model fits the data well.
In this model, the returns to the inputs also can be measured by output elasticities. The input
that makes the largest contribution to the value of the output is the number of days at sea. The
coefficient of fishing days is about 0.5401, so an increase of 1% in the number of days at sea
then the revenue will increase by 0.5401% while other variables are held constant. The
coefficients of horse power and crew size are 0.3105 and 0.3107 respectively. Thus, horse
power makes the smallest contribution to the gross revenue. The positive sign of area dummy
variable implies that the anchovy purse seiners around the island can get more gross revenue
than those in the mainland areas
However, a good regression model should not violate the least square assumptions. Some
various tests for errors are performed in this case. Jarque-Bera test for the normality of errors,
Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation and White test for the heteroskedasticity of the
errors (see table 6.4).
Table 6.4: Residual analysis
Some tests Test statistics P-value
1.  Test for Normality (Jarque –Bera  test) 3.9931 0.1358a
2.  Test for Heteroskedasticity (White test) 10.8576 0.6227a
3.  Test for Autocorrelation
     (Lagrange Multiplier(LM) test) 0.1382 0.7101
a
aStatistically significant at the level of 5%. Source: own data.
As can be revealed in the table 6.4, the Jarque –Bera (JB) test is performed to test the
normality. We can see that JB-value is equal to 3.9931, with P- value = 0.1358. This
probability is larger than 0.05. Thus we can conclude that the errors are normally distributed
at the 5% level of significance. The test for heteroskedasticity is performed by using the
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White test, with the test statistic of 10.8576 and P-value of 0.6227. This probability is much
larger than 0.05. Therefore, we accept the hypothesis that error variances are homogenous.
Finally, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is performed to test autocorrelation. The results
shown that LM-value is 0.1382, with P- value = 0.7101. This probability is much larger than
0.05. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelation and conclude that the errors are
uncorrelated at the 5% level of significance.
Table 6.5 represents the correlations between the explanatory variables. The pair correlations
of  horse power (HP) with crew size, number of fishing days and location are 0.5210, 0.3945
and 0.1539 respectively. The correlations of crew size with fishing days and location are
0.2759 and 0.1357 respectively.
Table 6.5: The correlations between the explanatory variables.
HP Crewsize Days Dlocation
HP 1.0000 0.5210 0.3945 0.1539
Crewsize 0.5210 1.0000 0.2759 0.1357
Days 0.3945 0.2759 1.0000 0.1441
Dlocation 0.1539 0.1357 0.1441 1.0000
Source: own data
In table 6.5, the results revealed that the correlation of horse power and crew size is the
highest. This may indicate the nearly collinear relationship between them. However, when
the model is estimated, the results indicate that all estimated coefficients are statistically
different from zero at the 1% level of significance or better. They have the expected signs and
magnitudes. Furthermore, an application of the F- test for testing the overall significance of
the model. The  results  show that at least one of the parameters is not zero at the level of
significance  = 0.01 or better. In addition, when we estimate the auxiliary regression, the
left-hand-side variable is the crew size and the right-hand-side variables are all the remaining
explanatory variables. R2 from the auxiliary regression is not high (R2=0.4296), then the
variation in crew size is not explained by the other explanatory variables. In this case, we
may  reject  the  multicollinarity in this study (Hill et al.,2008). In general, these tests indicate
that the estimated model is well specified.
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6.2.2. Results of standardised fishing effort function
Initially, many factors were considered to be inputs to generate fishing effort. However, some
of them were excluded from the final model because they neither individually nor jointly
provided any evidence to support their statistically significant effects on fishing effort of the
vessel.Consequently, the physical inputs – horsepower and number of fishing days are used
as proxy measures of capital invested and capital utilisation in the fisheries, and the crew size
is the number of crew members employed per vessel for a fishing trip, as the proxy for
variable input. These variables were identified as the main factors affecting the fishing effort
of the vessel. The estimated results are presented in Table 6.6
Table 6.6: Parameter estimate and test statistics of standardised fishing effort function
Estimated coefficient T-value P-value
Constant 1.9427 2.1443 0.0362
ln(HP) 0.3151 16.256 0.0000a
ln(Crewsize) 0.3193 3.4137 0.0012a
ln(Days) 0.5966 3.4838 0.0009a
R2 0.9353
F 279.3504 0.0000a
                              aStatistically significant at the level of 1%. Source: own data.
As shown in Table 6.3, the results indicate that the signs of all estimated coefficients are
positive and the coefficients of horse power, crew size and fishing days are statistically
different from zero at the 1% level of significance or better. This means that horse power,
crew size and fishing days have statistically significant effects on fishing effort. Furthermore,
the F-test is performed to test the overall significance of the model. Since F-value = 279.3504
with P- value = 0.0000, then at least one of the parameters is not zero at the level of
significance  = 0.01 or better. Thus, the estimated model is significant at the 1% level. In
addition, R2 = 0.9353 indicating that 95.43 % of the variation in the fishing effort is explained
by the variation in horse power, by the variation in crew size and by the variation in the
number of days at sea. In this case, the estimated model fits the data well.
In this model, the returns to the inputs also can be measured by output elasticities. The
elasticities and return to scale analysis has shown that the elasticities for the horse power and
crew size on the output revenue were smaller than 1 and the elasticity for the number of days
at sea was also smaller than 1. These results may seem reasonable while resources are
considered as overexploited.
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As mentioned above, a good regression model should not violate the least square assumptions.
Therefore, some various tests for errors are also performed for this model. Overall, these tests
show that this estimated model is well specified. The tests include the Jarque-Bera test for the
normality of errors, Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation and White test for the
heteroskedasticity of the errors (see table 6.7)
Table 6.7: Residual analysis
Some tests Test statistics P-value
1.  Test for Normality (Jarque –Bera  test) 1.7319 0.4206a
2.  Test for Heteroskedasticity (White test) 9.4886 0.3934a
3.  Test for Autocorrelation
     (Lagrange Multiplier(LM) test) 3.7091 0.0591
a
aStatistically significant at the level of 5%. Source: own data.
As can be shown in the table 6.7, the Jarque –Bera (JB) test is performed to test the normality.
We can see that JB-value is equal to 1.7319, with P- value = 0.4206. This probability is larger
much than 0.05. Thus we can conclude that the errors are normally distributed at the 5% level
of significance. The test for heteroskedasticity is performed by using the White test, with the
test statistic of 9.4886 and P-value of 0.3934. This probability is much larger than 0.05.
Therefore, we accept the hypothesis that error variances are homogenous. Finally, the
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is performed to test autocorrelation. The results revealed that
LM-value is 3.7091, with P- value = 0.0591. This probability is larger than 0.05. Thus, we
reject the null hypothesis of the existence of autocorrelation and conclude that the errors are
uncorrelated at the 5% level of significance.
Table 6.8 represents the correlations between the explanatory variables. The pair correlations
of  horse power (HP) with crew size and number of fishing days and location are 0.5210,
0.3945 respectively. The correlations of crew size with fishing days is 0.2759
Table 6.8: The correlations between the explanatory variables.
HP Crewsize Days
HP 1.0000 0.5210 0.3945
Crewsize 0.5210 1.0000 0.2759
Days 0.3945 0.2759 1.0000
                                     Source: own data
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In table 6.8, the results presented that the correlation of horse power and crew size is the
highest. This may indicate the nearly collinear relationship between them. However, when
the model is estimated, the results revealed that the signs of all estimated coefficients were
positive and showed their impacts on the fishing effort at the 1% level of significance or
better. Furthermore, an application of the F- test for testing the overall significance of the
model. The  results  show that the  estimated relationship is a significant one at the level of
significance  = 0.01 or better. In addition, when we estimate the auxiliary regression, the
left-hand-side variable is the crew size and the right-hand-side variables are all the remaining
explanatory variables. R2 from the auxiliary regression is not high (R2=0.4294), then the
variation in crew size is not explained by the other explanatory variables. In this case, we
may  reject  the  multicollinarity in this study (Hill et al.,2008). Overall, these tests show that
this estimated model is well specified.
After estimating the standardised fishing effort function. The equation used to standardise
fishing effort for each vessel is:
ie = exp (1.9427)*
5966.03193.03151.0
iii DaysCrewHP                   (Eq.1)
where HP is horsepower, iCrew  is the number of crew members and Days is the number of
fishing days in 2011.
The results estimated from Eq. 1 show that vessel number 31 has the lowest standardised
effort of 782.09, whereas the highest standardised effort of 2882.92 is for vessel number 48.
























Figure 6.1: The standardised fishing effort of the 62 anchovy purse seiners. Source: Own data.
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Relative standardised fishing effort
To compare the fishing effort and the costs among vessels the relative standardised effort is
calculated for each vessel. Figure 6.2 shows that the minimum and maximum values of
relative standardised effort are 0.44 and 1.64 respectively, with corresponding vessel numbers
31 and 48. An average value of relative standardised effort is 1.00. There were 30 vessels
with a relative standardised effort of greater than 1.0, whereas 32 vessels had a relative
standardised effort of less than 1.0. The majority of vessels with the relative standardised



























Figure 6.2: Relative standardised fishing effort of the 62 anchovy purse seiners. Source: Own data.
6.3. The cost efficient vessels
In this section, we will examine which vessel is the most cost-efficient. This is derived from
dividing the total cost of each vessel by its relative standardised effort. After that, we show
the Salter diagram with the relative standardised effort is along the horizontal axis and the
average cost per unit of relative standardised effort is along the vertical axis. In this study, the
total costs consist of variable cost, fixed cost, labour cost, depreciation and interest payment
on loans.
Figure 6.3 presents the cost-efficiency of 62 heterogeneous vessels. The standardised fishing
effort of each vessel is measured by the width of the bar whereas the height of the bar
measures the average cost per unit of relative standardised effort. The vessels are arranged
from the left to the right according to their cost efficiency, with vessel number 38 as the most
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cost efficient one and vessel number 32 as the least cost efficient. We notice that for example,
vessel number 23  produces 2.2 times as much effort as the vessel number 49 but this vessel
is less cost-efficiency than the latter. Figure 6.3 also shows that 21 of the 32 vessels with a
relative standardised effort above 1.0 are among the most cost-efficient vessels. Thus, 11
vessels that are among the most-efficient in effort terms are not among the most cost-efficient
vessels, when comparing the average costs.
Figure 6.3: The cost-efficiency among 62 anchovy purse seiners in 2011. Source: Own data
6.4. The profit under open access regime
A combination between the average revenue per unit of relative standardised effort5 and the
average cost per relative standardised effort of each vessel will help us to explain more
clearly why profits are still generated even under an open-access regime (see figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4 represents the level of rent generated among the vessels. We can see that any
vessel has the average revenue above the average cost, they can get the profit and vice versa.
This surplus is called intra-marginal rent. This rent accrues to those vessels that have lower
costs than the marginal vessel.
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In this study, the profit of the fishery in 2011 is generated by the most vessels excluding
vessel number 32 that made economic loss. This is based on the estimated cost and revenue
in figure 6.3, but was this also the case when using the account data that we collected for
vessel 32. However, by using the accounting method we can know exactly the amount of
money that vessel number 32 lost. The estimated ranking results for this and the other vessels
will generally be somewhat different from the account figures.
Overall, the intra-marginal rent is generated from the existence of heterogeneous vessels, of
which the most cost efficient vessels make above normal profits, called intra-marginal rent
(Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2011). This is in contrast to the case of homogeneous
vessels in which the rent equals to zero. Thus, this can indicate that the profits still generated
even under open access regime.
Figure 6.4:  The estimated average revenue AR(E), average cost (bar heights) and profit of 62
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In 2011, the inshore purse seine vessels in the sample of this study, on average, had positive
income, gross value added, gross cash flow and profit. The vessels earned a profit margin of
17.4 %. This implies that the owner of an average purse seiner vessel was not only capable of
covering all of the costs (including variable cost, fixed cost, labour cost, depreciation and
loan interest payment costs), but also turned a profit for the operating year. As shown in
Table 6.2, the results also revealed that larger engine vessels had a better annual economic
performance than those with smaller engine. This may be explained by two reasons. First, the
larger engine vessels have higher gross revenue due to the higher fishing efficiency and
higher catches. The anchovy purse seiners in Nha Trang follow the searching method so
vessels which  have  higher engine power which allows them to travel to other fishing
grounds in a short time to find fish. For these high-powered vessels, 2 to 4 hauls can be
performed in one night instead of 1 haul for smaller vessels. Second, they are on average
more cost-efficient than smaller vessels. The majority of vessels with the relative
standardised effort of bigger than 1.0 had engine capacities of greater than 120 HP. These
vessels are among the most cost-efficient vessels. Besides, the average annual profit and crew
income increase with engine power, there may be incentives for owner-operators to adopt
technologies that expand their fishing efficiency.
In the same year, the average annual income per crew member was about 36.6  million VND,
which is about 2% more than that of other people in the Khanh Hoa province (GSO of Khanh
Hoa, 2011) and about 26.7 % higher than the 2011 national average income per capita (GSO,
2012). This demonstrates that crew members may have earned their opportunity cost of
labour, or above, in the fishing season of 2011. The income of crew members was based on
the share system between the crew and the owner. The crew members receive 40% or 50%
after deduction of all operating expenses. Therefore, the share system offers more incentives
for the crew to work hard and helps the vessel owners to use labour more efficiently (Ngoc et
al., 2009). However, without further investigation it is not possible to tell if lower crew
remuneration would still provide sufficient manpower for this fishery.
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In general, of all the coastal fisheries, the anchovy purse seine fishery is now considered the
most attractive one because of its high return ratio in comparison with the annual bank
deposit interest  rates, which is at 14% in 2011 (The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), 2011).
Consequently, the purse seine fishery may continue expanding as well as attracting additional
vessels to this fishery in the near future.
Capital investment and operating expenses are relatively great in this fishery. The risk of
damaging vessels and fishing gear, and losing workers is high. The risk of damage is quite
large for this fishery because the anchovies live in the coral reefs. Therefore, the nets are
often torn when they are caught in these coral reefs. These risk factors are, of course, also
valid for vessels and crew and, especially in bad weather, they may result in serious outcomes.
In principle, risk- induced private costs, such as insurance, maintenance and repair costs of
fishing gear and vessels, are included in the costs of this study.
7.2. Results from the model of annual vessel production.
In the model of annual vessel production, we want to investigate the main factors affecting
vessel production. In this model, the results indicate that engine power, crew size, and fishing
days of Nha Trang’s anchovy purse seiners have a positive impact on gross revenue. These
results may seem reasonable. As mentioned above, the greater engine vessels have higher
gross revenue due to higher catches and higher fishing efficiency. The highest possible speed
is desired to prevent the active fish school from escaping, and to reduce the influence of wind
drift and water current on the operation. Besides, greater engine power also helps vessels to
access other fishing grounds in a short time in order to find fish. With regard to the impact of
crew size, more crew enable the catch to be removed and processed more quickly, allowing
more hauls to take place over a given period of time. Hence, crew size has a positive effect on
gross revenue of the vessel. The results also show that the gross revenue varies with respect
to locations. The dummy variable for location helps to distinguish how the characteristics of
locations can affect revenue, with 1 for the island and 0 for the mainland areas. The positive
sign of area dummy variable implies that the anchovy purse seiners around the island can get
more gross revenue than those in the mainland areas. The explanation for this is that the
fishermen live on the island having the traditional fisheries. The fishing experiences are
passed down from generation to generation. Therefore, they can catch more efficiently. In
addition, these fishers live nearer the fishing ground than other people, so they can access it
more quickly and, thus, have more time for fishing.
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7.3. Results from the model of standardised fishing effort
Fishing effort is considered as an intermediate output which transfers from the factors of
production to harvesting quantity (Flaaten, 2011). Initially, many factors were considered to
be inputs to generate fishing effort. However, some of them were excluded from the final
model because they neither individually nor jointly provided any evidence to support their
statistically significant effects on fishing effort of the vessel. Consequently, engine power
effect, number of crew size and number of fishing days are identified as the main factors
affecting the fishing effort of the vessel. The crew size is chosen as an important independent
variable here in the purse seine fishery due to the fact that a fishing trip cannot be performed
if it is not enough crew members. Besides, the number of fishing days is referred to as the
volume of resource devoted to fishing and the physical input – horsepower is used as proxy
measures of capital invested, are also considered as the factors generating fishing effort.
As shown in Table 6.3, the results indicate that the signs of all estimated coefficients were
positive and showed their impacts on the fishing effort. In this model, the returns to the inputs
also can be measured by output elasticities. The elasticities and return to scale analysis has
shown that the elasticities for the horse power and crew size on the output revenue were
smaller than 1 and the elasticity for the number of days at sea was also smaller than 1. These
results may seem reasonable while resources are considered as overexploited.
7.4. Cost-efficient vessels and intra-marginal rent
To compare fishing effort and costs among vessels, the relative standardised effort is
calculated for each vessel. The relative fishing power differed among the vessels. Vessels
equipped with high engine power, a large number of crew members and a large number of
fishing days have the greater relative standardised effort. The results showed that a large
number of vessels with high relative standardised effort (more than one) were the most
efficient vessels, both from a fishing efficiency and from a cost efficiency point of view. As a
result, intra-marginal rent is mostly generated by these vessels. From these results, the purse
seine fishery may continue expanding, as well as attract fishing investors to this fishery in the
near future. Either investments in engine capacity and fishing gear or an additional increase
in fishing time may continue this growth. This seems to reflect somewhat the situation of
Khanh Hoa’s fisheries since the total engine power of the fishing fleet continued to increase
in 2011.
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Overall, intra-marginal rent is generated from the existence of heterogeneous vessels, of
which the most cost efficient vessels make above-normal profits, called intra-marginal rent
(Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Flaaten, 2011). This could imply that even in an open-access
fishery, some vessels may improve their economic performance by the introduction of cost
saving practices. It is important to note that even under an open-access regime many vessels




The economic performance of inshore purse seine vessels in an open-access fishery have
been investigated in this study, based on a 2011 survey of costs and earning data of a sample
of 62 anchovy purse seiners in Nha Trang, Vietnam. The presented economic analysis shows
that an average purse seiner was able to cover all costs and earned a profit margin of 17.4%
and crew members earned their opportunity cost of labour or above. This is close to what was
expected, based on discussion of the theory of open-access fisheries. These results indicate
that the purse seine fishery may continue expanding as well as attracting fishing investors to
this fishery in the near future.
This study also investigated factors affecting annual vessel production. In this analysis,
engine power, number of crew, number of fishing days and dummy variable for location are
identified as the main factors affecting the gross revenue of the vessel. Thus, these are the
factors that best produce indicators of vessel efficiency. The elasticities and return to scale
analysis have shown that the input that makes the largest contribution to the value of the
gross revenue is the number of days at sea.
To compare the fishing effort and the costs among vessels the relative standardised effort is
calculated for each vessel. The results showed that a large number of vessels with high
relative standardised effort (more than one) were the most efficient vessels, both from a
fishing efficiency and from a cost efficiency point of view. These vessels earned most of the
intra-marginal rent generated. This could imply that even in an open-access fishery with
heterogeneous vessels, some vessels may improve their economic performance by the
introduction of cost saving practices. Therefore, these vessels may create the most benefits
for society.
The empirical findings of positive vessel profit and good crew earnings in the purse seine
fishery is a sign of possible further expansion of the capacity and effort of the fleet in this
open-access fishery, unless resource depletion comes first. From a resource conservation
objective point of view the results we have found indicate that policies aiming to reduce the
overall fishing effort should be instigated. A reduction in the number of vessels or the number
of days at sea of the fishermen could be a way forward. Policies should aim at such
reductions without reducing revenue and catch of the remaining vessels. Furthermore, the
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programs that help to create alternative income by development of other sectors such as
aquaculture, agriculture and to improve education of fishermen could be implemented to
mitigate over-exploitation of the resources (Ngoc et al., 2009).
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ANNUAL SURVEY ON ON INSHORE PURE SEINE VESSELS
 IN NHA TRANG CITY, VIETNAM
I. General information:
1. Data of the year:                       Period of data from month….………to month  .................
2. Time of survey:     Date.............month............year..............................................................
3. Main fishery ………………… Other……………………………………………………...
4. Name of interviewer:…………………5. Phone number of interviewer………………
 II. Information about vessel and owner
1. Registered vessel number ………………………………………………………….
2. Vessel owner’ name..................................................................................................
3. Address ………………………. ………………..Phone number: …………………
4. Hull length (m):…………………………………………………………………….
5. Year of building vessel ……If vessel owner does not know, please tick here…………
6. Engine power (HP):………………………………………………………………...
III. Information about labor
Skipper Crew (including skipper)
1. Skipper information
a.  Does skipper have a  license?     Yes/ No
b. Skipper educational level.......................
c. Skipper age ...........................................
d. Skipper experience (years).....................
e. Skipper vocational training time............
f. Does skipper come from traditional fishing
household?........................Yes/ No
2.Average crew size (persons)………………….
3. Income/person      (1000 VND)
a. Average income/month in main season:..............
b. Average income/ month in sub-season :………....
4. Total income of household in year (million VND)
a. From fishing operation:..............
b. From other activities:………....
IV. Information about harvested quantity, season, fishing grounds and weather
Items Main season Sub season
1.Number of trips in year
2. Average quantities of catch per trip
a. Main species 1 (kg)
b. Main species 2 (kg)
c. Main species 3 (kg)
d. Main species 4 (kg)
 f. Others (kg)
3. Average duration per trip (days)
4. Number of operating months (months)
5. Fishing grounds
6. Special weather? (Storms)
63
V. Capital Items
























3. Auxiliary engine (generator)
4. Mechanic equipment
a. Winch
b. Normal lighting system
(battery and lamps)
c. Lighting system for fishing
d. Other mechanic equipment 1


































VIII. Insurance and Tax




2. Annual registration fee
5. Other
IX. Loan
Interest paymentDebt at the end of







X. Average variable costs/trip
Main season Other season
Items Quantity Value (1000 VND) Quantity Value (1000 VND)
1.Fuel











1.Total revenue for all (1000 VND)
2.Average revenue per trip (1000 VND)
3.Crew share in % after deducting operating costs
4.Crew share in % after deducting for total costs
5. Average annual price (VND/kg) -
a. Main species 1
b. Main species 2
c. Main species 3
d. Main species 4
e. Other
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Table C: The Standardised effort, Relative standardised effort and Average cost per standardised effort
of the 62 purse seine vessels









1 350 2006.84 2469.19 1.40 1429.87
2 60 1080.79 1356.68 0.77 1401.54
3 250 1627.86 2272.63 1.29 1260.16
4 550 1876.42 2708.04 1.54 1219.03
5 140 1472.52 1813.79 1.03 1428.28
6 450 2077.98 2797.63 1.59 1306.74
7 450 2002.68 2719.25 1.55 1295.69
8 120 1603.22 1818.93 1.03 1550.66
9 140 1604.38 1909.46 1.09 1478.21
10 80 1338.15 1511.76 0.86 1557.26
11 380 1938.16 2615.51 1.49 1303.68
12 90 1378.80 1447.08 0.82 1676.28
13 160 1610.95 1948.12 1.11 1454.80
14 140 1466.70 1936.46 1.10 1332.52
15 56 1066.87 1204.83 0.68 1557.85
16 120 1637.55 1779.30 1.01 1619.14
17 140 1556.63 1826.88 1.04 1499.04
18 190 1587.95 1921.57 1.09 1453.85
19 100 1551.98 1643.10 0.93 1661.73
20 30 779.87 930.48 0.53 1474.54
21 160 1727.26 1905.38 1.08 1594.83
22 120 1536.92 1692.87 0.96 1597.23
23 384 2002.73 2646.45 1.50 1331.37
24 90 1439.08 1502.67 0.85 1684.85
25 120 1559.76 1662.53 0.95 1650.54
26 90 1506.98 1560.20 0.89 1699.29
27 56 875.32 1146.45 0.65 1343.23
28 160 1594.93 1905.38 1.08 1472.64
29 240 1627.38 2156.52 1.23 1327.62
30 90 1407.33 1457.38 0.83 1698.88
31 22 717.74 782.09 0.44 1614.55
32 22 983.88 846.94 0.48 2043.75
33 270 1713.40 2246.92 1.28 1341.56
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34 140 1509.11 1854.68 1.05 1431.50
35 45 1042.61 1201.76 0.68 1526.31
36 45 1001.24 1201.76 0.68 1465.75
37 50 1036.56 1291.94 0.73 1411.53
38 120 1151.22 1676.17 0.95 1208.31
39 350 1944.70 2548.60 1.45 1342.42
40 240 1634.19 2180.23 1.24 1318.68
41 90 1257.76 1399.12 0.80 1581.55
42 50 1009.11 1121.27 0.64 1583.32
43 250 1877.91 2324.63 1.32 1421.22
44 90 1304.07 1554.82 0.88 1475.57
45 60 1247.69 1347.29 0.77 1629.23
46 180 1665.05 1977.43 1.12 1481.38
47 80 1158.40 1550.90 0.88 1314.06
48 495 2025.59 2882.92 1.64 1236.11
49 50 878.73 1248.61 0.71 1238.13
50 66 988.72 1305.55 0.74 1332.35
51 320 1758.36 2477.64 1.41 1248.56
52 280 1543.44 2116.51 1.20 1282.94
53 60 1022.46 1290.04 0.73 1394.38
54 140 1600.11 1798.78 1.02 1564.98
55 180 1566.94 1813.12 1.03 1520.42
56 60 950.18 1243.52 0.71 1344.29
57 120 1224.72 1585.62 0.90 1358.87
58 60 1120.83 1324.20 0.75 1489.11
59 60 1093.93 1324.20 0.75 1453.37
60 120 1401.55 1693.84 0.96 1455.71
61 320 1695.24 2207.47 1.25 1351.06
62 60 1077.68 1266.92 0.72 1496.50
